The re-emergence of the 4-4-2

At the start of this season, the suggestion of playing a 4-4-2 would have been met with a snort of derision from any football fan that prides themselves on knowing the difference between a sweeper and a libero. To many, the formation is dead and buried, a relic of a bygone era, and replaced with more innovate and effective models. Alas, that opinion should no longer be widely held, as the formation has returned to the game in a big way, and has played a pivotal role in deciding some of the biggest matches this season; both in England and continentally.

Once the default formation of the British footballing world, the 4-4-2 took a rapid decline in popularity following that dismal showing in the 2010 World Cup, when it was made apparent that when compared to the 4-3-3s and 4-2-3-1s of other nations, the system was outdated. The change was not only forthcoming in international football, but also trickled down into the lower leagues and divisions; save for the odd manager who clung onto the cornerstone of the country’s footballing culture.

Outside of England, the change wasn’t as recent as the last World Cup. By 2000, Spain had adopted the now popular 4-2-3-1, whilst Jose Mourinho’s Porto won the Champions League in 2004 with a 4-3-1-2 system, against a Monaco team that started with a 4-3-3. The attacking limitations of the 4-4-2 had been diagnosed abroad, and other countries shed the formation, opting for a more fluid style of play.

The fact was that due to the layout – the two rigid lines of four players – distributing the ball effectively to the strikers was difficult without losing the shape of the formation, and leaving a side susceptible to a counter-attack. Whilst it was, and still is, a strong defensive tactic, the 4-4-2 did not normally adhere to a possession based passing game; the world’s new favourite way of playing football.

That’s not to say that the 4-4-2 has never been successful; far from it. Arrigo Sacchi’s Milan were probably the most successful team to adopt the formation, with consecutive European Cups in 1989 and 1990, but as the game progressed, it was only logical that managers would look to oppose the style, and as a result, the 4-4-2 became ineffective against sides who knew how to combat it. Such is the cyclical nature of footballing tactics.

However, this season has marked a return of the formation by ‘big teams’ in important matches. Whilst the 4-4-2 may still feature in the lower leagues, it wouldn’t be expected to crop up in The Champions League semi-final, or indeed for a team regularly playing it to win the Premier League, or sit atop La Liga with one game still to play.

So what has sparked the return of the formation deemed taboo following the post-World Cup autopsy of 2010? Here are a few reasons:

Countering tiki-taka

Much like the deployment of attacking or defensive midfielders to combat the 4-4-2, the formation works as a solid defence against passing football because it constricts the space in the defensive half for other teams to exploit. If the players hold their positions, then teams will struggle to break it down, because of the lack of space between the rows of four in midfield and defence.

An example of this was Real Madrid’s two victories over Bayern Munich – conceding possession and sitting deep, Real strangled Bayern’s attacking flair, which caused them to overexert, and leave them vulnerable on the counter. Before the first leg, Bayern had scored in their last fifteen Champions League matches. However, the shape imposed by Ancelotti, who incidentally played under Arrigo Sacchi’s all-conquering 4-4-2, ensured that the victory was of relative ease; an outrageous achievement, when you consider their opposition.

Real were not the only Madrid based side to adopt a 4-4-2 in key games and look to exploit the counter. Atletico found their way to the Champions League final by knocking out Barcelona in a similar fashion. In their semi-final against Chelsea, once they had the away goal advantage, Simeone’s men reverted to their familiar state, and allowed Mourinho’s men to attack, and timing their counter measures to perfection.

The 4-4-2 could, and probably should, be adopted by sides playing Spain in the World Cup this year. Real’s Copa del Rey victory over Barcelona illustrated the weakness in the tiki-taka system – the turnover of play and subsequent attack. With a strong defensive structure, the loss of possession works as a Trojan horse; allowing the opposition to attack, whilst their over exertion plays into the hands of those without the ball.

A solid defensive measure

The 4-4-2 is not only effective in nullifying the tiki-taka style of Bayern Munich or Barcelona; it is universal in its strength in defensive football. If correctly executed, with zonal marking, in order to preserve the formation’s shape, opponents are met with a wall of players, and few options in surpassing them. Chelsea’s 2-0 win at Anfield managed to nullify one of the most dangerous attacking teams in Premier League history; by retaining their shape, and making their opponents play into their hands. By the 50^th minute mark, Liverpool had resorted to long shots and crossing into the box, neither of which proved successful, because of the 4-4-2’s kibosh on fluid, attacking football. Against, when Liverpool had to throw men forward to try and beat the defence, Chelsea were able to hit them on the counter and double their lead, ensuring the win. Much like the Real victory over Bayern Munich, the side that conceded possession and territory to a proficient attacking team were not only victorious, but also managed to keep a clean sheet. The claims of ‘parking the bus’ will have little effect on Chelsea or Real Madrid if it continues to bring them results in big matches.

Opposing the majority

In recent years, a number of teams have progressed up the English league system by opposing the status quo, and playing a different style of football teams are not accustomed to opposing. The likes of Swansea City, Southampton and Blackpool are all fine examples of sides that attempted a more adventurous style and were rewarded for their bravery. This year, both Championship sides that earned automatic promotion play a 4-4-2; Leicester City and Burnley. Three at the back is a popular strategy for Championship teams, as is the 4-2-3-1, so perhaps unpredictability assisted the two sides in their success. Over the course of the season, Leicester amassed a points total of 102, whilst recording 17 clean sheets. Likewise, Burnley scored 93 points, and collected 19 clean sheets. Defensive stability was a key component in their promotion, securing the defensive before attacking.

Necessity

However, the exception to the rule of 4-4-2’s defence first strategy is Manchester City, 2013/14 Premier League Champions. Manuel Pellegrini opted for the system for the majority of the season, although sometimes playing a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3, and were highly successful in not only winning games, but racking up the goals in the process. City’s season consisted of 57 games; they only failed to score in five of them, with an average of 2.9 goals a game.

However, City’s 4-4-2 was not one of structure, but of one of necessity; it was one of the few ways Pellegrini could fit in all his key players and keep the squad balanced; i.e. not overly attacking. Over the course of the season, City had the luxury of at least two strikers in form at any one point, be it Sergio Agüero, Edin Džeko, Álvaro Negredo or Stevan Jovetić. As a result, Pellegrini built his tactics around feeding the front men, and made adjustments accordingly. The side overcame the limitations of the shape with attacking full-backs and the fluidity of Yaya Touré, whose ability to both play in central midfield and behind the front two was exceptionally helpful in ensuring a healthy return of goals.

It is important to note that a formation will not win a game on its own. The application, style of play, and ability of personnel all play vital roles, but it is interesting to note that a recently discarded formation has fought its way back to the forefront of European tactics. The World Cup will be an interesting tactical spectacle, as footballing culture will play a huge part in determining style of play, but does not necessarily mean that South American teams will be afraid to play a more conservative style. If a major nation like Brazil, Argentina, Spain or Germany could be undone by a side with a strong defensive structure, then the implications it would have on the perception of pragmatic football would be huge. If it brings the possibility of winning the World Cup, then jeers of ‘parking the bus’ will matter very little.

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